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Abstract   
Two recent electoral results - Donald Trump’s election as US president and the UK’s Brexit 
vote - have re-ignited debate on the psychological factors underlying voting behavior. Both 
campaigns promoted themes of fear, lost pride, and loss aversion, which are relevant to the 
personality dimension of Neuroticism, a construct previously not associated with voting 
behavior. To that end, we investigate whether regional prevalence of neurotic personality traits 
(Neuroticism, Anxiety, Depression) predicted voting behavior in the US (N = 3,167,041) and 
the UK (N = 417,217), comparing these effects with previous models, which have emphasized 
the roles of Openness and Conscientiousness. Neurotic traits positively predicted share of 
Brexit and Trump votes and Trump gains from Romney. Many of these effects persisted in 
additional robustness tests controlling for regional industrial heritage, political attitude, and 
socio-economic features, particularly in the US. The “sleeper effect” of neurotic traits may 
profoundly impact the geopolitical landscape. 
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Fear, populism, and the geopolitical landscape: The “sleeper effect” of neurotic 
personality traits on regional voting behavior in the 2016 Brexit and Trump votes   
 
In 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) voted to leave the European Union (EU) (a decision 
known as “Brexit”) and Donald J. Trump was elected as President of the United States (US). 
The widespread media coverage of the Brexit and Trump campaigns characterized them as 
being quite unlike other recent campaigns, particularly in their use of so-called populist themes 
(Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Pettigrew, 2017).  
The Brexit and Trump campaigns were different in many ways, but one thing they had 
in common, according to one popular media narrative, was their focus on stoking fears in the 
electorate. In Britain, the Vote Leave campaign and the UK Independence Party (UKIP), for 
example, stoked citizens’ worries about immigration and terrorism; the UKIP campaigned to 
“Take Back Control” from the EU by establishing firm borders to reduce the threats of 
multiculturalism on economic independence and freedom. In the US, Donald Trump’s 
campaign to “Make America Great Again” followed populist themes and was based on appeals 
to fear (Nai & Maier, 2018); specifically, the campaign appealed to a belief that an influx of 
immigrants has weakened the nation’s values, economy, and security (The Atlantic, 2016). The 
fact that such rhetoric resonated with so many voters surprised many people, including political 
analysts, right up to the moment when the final results were announced.  
Even sophisticated forecasting models that used historical voting records and 
demographic data, predicted victories for the Vote Remain and Clinton campaigns (see, for 
example, Millward, 2016). Evidently, the models traditionally used for predicting and 
explaining political behavior did not capture an essential factor that influenced people’s voting 
decisions in 2016. So how are we to understand the changing geopolitical landscape? What 
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factors might account for the surprising receptivity to this recent emergence of populist 
campaigns?  
Research has long highlighted the role of psychological factors in influencing political 
ideology and political behavior, including voting behavior in major elections (Avery, Lester, & 
Yang, 2015; Barbaranelli, Caprara, Vecchione, & Fraley, 2007; Choma & Hanoch, 2017; Jost 
et al., 2003; Pesta & McDaniel, 2014). In the domain of personality, political orientation 
(typically defined in terms a liberal vs. conservative continuum) has been linked to the 
dimensions of the Big Five model (John & Srivastava, 1999); in particular, studies point to a 
moderate to large association between political conservatism and low Openness and a small but 
reliable association between conservatism and high Conscientiousness (Carney, Jost, Gosling, 
& Potter, 2008; Jost, 2006; McCrae, 1996; Sibley, Osborne, & Duckitt, 2012). Similar findings 
were revealed by studies undertaken at the regional level (Rentfrow et al., 2013; Rentfrow, Jost, 
Gosling, & Potter, 2009). 
 However, the recent populist campaigns, which have played upon voters’ fears, point to 
the possible role of another personality dimension—the one most closely tied to anxiety, anger, 
and fear, namely Neuroticism (Barlow, Ellard, Sauer-Zavala, Bullis, & Carl, 2014; Digman, 
1990; Eysenck, 1947). In personality research, Neuroticism is usually defined as emotional 
instability characterized by more extreme and maladaptive responses to stressors and a higher 
likelihood of negative emotions (e.g., anxiety, anger, and fear). One integrative summary of 
various conceptions of the Big Five dimensions, characterizes Neuroticism in terms of a 
reactivity to negative events or stressors and to environmental and social threats (Denissen & 
Penke, 2008). This conception of Neuroticism as a lowered threshold for detecting and 
responding to stimuli as threatening or dangerous, suggests that individuals high on this trait 
will be more receptive to campaigns, such as populism, which specifically prey on fears of 
looming threats and dangers. Research shows that once these fears have been activated, they 
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can affect decisions of all kinds, including voting behavior (Alesina & Passarelli, 2015). As a 
result, regions higher in Neuroticism should show particularly big swings in the populist 
directions. As such, we propose that Neuroticism might be responsible for a kind of “sleeper 
effect,” such that, under normal conditions it has no influence, but in certain circumstances 
(e.g., the rise of populism) it can play a significant role in determining consequential outcomes.  
Here we test potential “sleeper effects” of Neuroticism by investigating the links 
between regional levels of neurotic traits and votes for Brexit and Trump in the 2016 elections. 
In particular, we test the hypothesis that regions with high scores on neurotic traits, namely 
Trait Neuroticism and two sub-facets, Trait Anxiety and Trait Depression (Soto & John, 2009), 
are associated with support for Brexit and Trump. We compare the effects of these neurotic 
traits with those of Openness and Conscientiousness, which are the known regional personality 
correlates of political orientation and voting behavior. We also control for alternative 
explanations, namely historical industrial decline (lost pride), political attitude (liberal), 
education, race, and current economic hardship.  
Method 
 Here we summarize the key elements of the design; for details of the samples, 
selection procedures, representativeness, challenges to validity, focal variables, and control 
variables, see Online Supplementary Materials).  
Regional level. We conduct our analysis at the county level in the US. In the UK, we 
analyze the Local Authority District (LAD) level; there we focus only on regions in Scotland, 
England, and Wales because the control variables are not available for Northern Ireland. 
Personality data. The UK personality data (N=417,217) come from a large Internet-
based survey designed and administered between 2009 and 2011 in collaboration with the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC UK Lab project; see Rentfrow, Jokela, & Lamb, 
2015); participants were spread across 379 LADs with at least 100 participants in each. The 
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US personality data (N=3,167,041) come from the Gosling-Potter Internet Project, collected 
between 2003 and 2015 and divided into 2,082 counties, with at least 100 participants in each.  
 Personality data were collected using the 44-item Big Five Inventory (BFI; John & 
Srivastava, 1999). We focus on neurotic traits: Neuroticism as a broad Big Five trait and 
Anxiety and Depression as established sub-facets of Neuroticism. We aggregated the 
individual-level scores based on the LAD/county in which the participants lived. We compare 
the neurotic traits to the role of Openness and Conscientiousness, the established regional 
personality correlates of voting behavior. 
Election data. We focus on two kinds of dependent variables (DVs). The first is the 
simple vote share for  
Brexit and Trump, testing the idea that regions high on Neuroticism were particularly likely to 
be swayed by populist campaigns. This DV mirrors those used in previous analyses and allows 
us to test whether the 2016 elections differed from previous ones in now showing associations 
with regional Neuroticism where previous votes had been associated only with regional 
Openness and Conscientiousness.   
The second kind of DV, which we can measure only in the US analyses, focuses on that 
part of Trump’s vote that is not merely due to him being the Republican candidate. In other 
words, we examine the shift to Trump, over and above the region’s historical tendency to vote 
for Republican candidates. We thus aim at capturing the specific impact (and success) of 
Trump’s populist campaign, with its clearer focus on fears and (potential) losses than seen in 
previous campaigns (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). It has been suggested that it was these particular 
shifts to Trump (e.g., in battlefield states) that lead to his victory (The Washington Post, 2016). 
Data on the Brexit results are available at the LAD level from the UK Electoral 
Commission (2016). The dependent variable was the share of votes for Brexit among the valid 
votes (M = 53.17%, SD = 10.42).  
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US election data come from open data sources (Github 2017; OpenDataSoft 2016). For 
the first dependent variable, we use the share of Trump vote which is calculated as the two-
party vote share for the Republicans in 2016 (henceforth: Trump votes) (M = 63.4, SD = 15.65).  
To examine the shift to Trump over and above the existing tendency to vote Republican, 
we compute the change of the Republican two-party vote from 2012 to 2016. For example if 
Trump as the Republican candidate in 2016 had a 50% two-party vote share and Romney as the 
2012 candidate had a 40% two-party vote share, the gain would be 10%. This gain in the two-
party vote share (henceforth: Trump gains) is our second dependent variable for the US analysis 
(M = 5.22, SD = 5.28). Naturally, such a gain equals the corresponding loss of the Democratic 
candidate. 
Control variables. We control for an array of variables which could potentially explain 
voting behavior.  
First, we control for population density because voters in regions with higher population 
density (e.g. larger cities) tend not to vote for conservative candidates. In the UK analysis, we 
also included country dummies for Scotland and Wales. Scotland and Wales are special cases 
because of simmering independence movements and local culture. For example, there are strong 
economic motives in Scotland to remain in the EU even after a potential independence from the 
UK because a small country, like Scotland disproportionally gains from free trade in the EU 
(Schiff, 1997). 
Second, we consider the regions’ industrial heritage. Recent studies and popular 
narratives suggest that voters in the industrialized heartlands of the UK and US were 
particularly likely to vote for Brexit and Donald Trump. One reason could be that the 
industrialized areas (e.g., the Rust Belt in the US) are in a long phase of decline (Autor et al., 
2013; Autor et al., 2017). One major promise of the Trump campaign was a policy shift away 
from free trade to protect jobs in the industrialized heartland (“bringing back the 
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manufacturing”). Additionally, popular narratives suggest that the workforce in these industries 
viewed themselves with a lot of pride and the loss of this pride during the industrial decline 
might have made them susceptible to populist campaigns (see also Inglehart & Norris, 2016). 
To capture the effect of the historical industrial decline in the old industrial centers, we include 
the employment share in manufacturing and mining in the US for the year 1970 (M = 25.3%, 
SD = 11.76) and in the UK for the year 1971 as controls (M = 34.33%, SD = 12.34). We chose 
data from the early 1970s over later time periods because they provide good estimates of the 
industrial structure before de-industrialization accelerated from the 1980s onwards. 
Third, we consider political attitudes of the regional populace. Prior research has shown 
that people who consider themselves as liberal tend to vote for left-wing parties and people who 
consider themselves as conservatives tend to vote for right-wing parties (e.g., Langer & Cohen, 
2005). So here we examine whether neurotic traits add any incremental predictive validity 
beyond a simple effect of political attitudes. Specifically, we include a control variable 
reflecting the liberal political attitude of the regional populace (single item: “I see myself as 
someone who is politically liberal”, ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree). The 
individual-level data come from the Gosling-Potter Internet Project in both countries and were 
aggregated to the corresponding regional levels in the US (M = 2.74, SD = 0.24) and UK (M = 
2.97, SD = 0.21). 
Fourth, the Trump and Brexit campaigns were reported to stir up racial tensions with 
regard to migration (e.g., Major, Blodorn, & Blascovich, 2016) and racial composition of the 
population can predict voting behavior (e.g. Rentfrow et al., 2015; Autor et al., 2017). We 
therefore included the share of white inhabitants (US: M = 83.29%, SD = 15.24; UK M = 
90.39%, SD = 12.28).  
Fifth, we consider current economic hardship in the region. Voters suffering from poor 
economic conditions can voice their dissent with current economic policy by voting for the 
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opposition (Republicans in the 2016 US election) or the Brexit campaign. We include the 
unemployment share and earnings in our analysis. In the US case, we use the 2015 
unemployment data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (M = 5.56%, SD = 1.74) and the yearly 
income per capita in the 2010-2014 period from the American Community Survey (ACS) (M = 
$24.688, SD = 5.829). In the UK, we use the unemployment data from the 2011 Census (M = 
6.13%, SD = 2.07) and the weekly income in 2011 from Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
(M = £490.83, SD = 114.56). 
Finally, we also use the educational attainment of the population as a control variable 
because education can also predict election results (Rentfrow et al., 2013). We expect 
educational attainment to be important for two reasons. First, better educated people have 
profited in the last decades from free trade in terms of better job chances and higher earnings 
(Autor, 2014). This makes it more likely that they will vote against Trump and Brexit, which 
have isolationistic tendencies. Second, populist campaigns may offer simplified solutions to 
complex problems and better educated people might find these simplified solutions unrealistic 
and thus vote against these campaigns (Seligson, 2007). In the US, we use the population share 
with a bachelor degree or higher. The data come from the 2010 ACS 5yr estimates in the US 
(M = 21.92%, SD = 9.56). In the UK, we use the population share with NVQ level 4 
qualification or above, roughly equivalent to degree level. The data come from the 2011 Census 
(M = 26.91%, SD = 7.67).  
All variables and their sources are reported in Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Results 
Tables 2 and 3 report correlations between the variables of interest in the UK and the 
US. In the UK case, there were moderate correlations between Brexit votes and the neurotic 
traits (Neuroticism: r = 0.26, p < 0.05; Anxiety: r = 0.36, p < 0.05; Depression: r = 0.11, p < 
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0.05). The correlations between Trump shares and the neurotic traits were also moderate in size 
(Neuroticism: r = 0.37, p < 0.05; Anxiety: r = 0.38, p < 0.05; Depression: r = 0.22, p < 0.05), 
whereas the correlations between Trump Gains and the neurotic traits were slightly larger 
(Neuroticism: r = 0.44, p < 0.05; Anxiety: r = 0.45, p < 0.05; Depression: r = 0.29, p < 0.05). 
The main correlation between Neuroticism and Brexit votes is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, 
which map the regional distribution of both variables for the UK. Visual inspection of the maps 
suggests that rural areas in the East of England and the industrialized centers have higher 
neurotic traits and higher Brexit votes. Likewise, the corresponding US maps (Figure 3 and 4) 
illustrate the observed correlation between Neuroticism and election results for Trump. We use 
the map for Trump gains (and not for absolute Trump votes) in Figure 3 because we believe 
that these gains are a better indicator for the specific receptivity to campaigns addressing fears, 
as explained above. Those Trump gains, which are widely believed to be decisive in the 2016 
presidential election (The Washington Post, 2016), and higher neurotic traits indeed overlap in 
the maps. Both are found predominantly in the North East and around the Great Lakes where 
many battlefield states such as Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Ohio went from Democratic in 
2012 to Republican 2016. The old industrial center of the US, the “Rust Belt” also shows a 
concentration of both Neuroticism and Trump gains.  
[Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
[Figures 1-4 about here] 
Next, we present OLS regression results for both countries. All variables were z-
standardized to ease interpretation of the coefficients. We tested the Neuroticism (or its 
subfacets) model against the Openness and Conscientiousness model, and also included 
different sets of control variables (e.g., to consider potential overlap between economic 
hardship and education levels, which might lead to multicollinearity). We tested six models in 
each country: The first model included the effects of Neuroticism and of basic controls. The 
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second model included the effects of Openness and Conscientiousness (but not Neuroticism) 
and the basic controls. The third model included Neuroticism and also Openness and 
Conscientiousness plus the basic controls. The fourth model added the historical industrial 
decline (historical industry structure) to control for the “lost pride” effect. The fifth model added 
political attitudes, race, and current economic hardship. The sixth model replaced economic 
hardship with education. We also regressed models including economic hardship and education 
at the same time but the correlation of these control variables was very high, which led to 
unstable regression results due to multicollinearity. Thus, we do not present a model including 
all control variables at one time.  
All the models throughout the paper were tested using OLS as the regression technique. 
Note that in most models the Breusch-Pagan test reveals heteroscedasticity, which biases the t-
statistics and leads to erroneous conclusions about statistical significance. To avoid this 
problem, we use heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
 Models 1, 2, and 3 were conducted to evaluate the extent to which regional differences 
in Neuroticism, Openness, and Conscientiousness contributed to Brexit and Trump votes. As 
can be seen in Tables 4 (Brexit), 5 (Trump votes), and 6 (Trump gains), the results from model 
1 revealed that Neuroticism positively predicted Brexit votes (leave) (Table 4: β = 0.30, SE = 
0.04, p < 0.001), Trump votes (Table 5: β = 0.36, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001), and Trump gains (Table 
6: β = 0.43, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001). The addition of Neuroticism (model 3) to the model that 
included only Openness and Conscientiousness (model 2) led to an increase in explained 
variance of 3% in the prediction of Brexit votes, 7% in the prediction of Trump votes, and 11% 
in the prediction of Tramp gains. Higher population density was negatively related to Brexit 
votes (Table 4: β = -0.53, SE = 0.04, p < 0.001), Trump votes (Table 5: β = -0.29, SE = 0.02, p 
< 0.01), and Trump gains (Table 6: β = -0.16, SE = 0.02, p < 0.01). Additionally, Brexit votes 
were lower in Scottish LADs (Table 4: β = -0.47, SE = 0.03, p < 0.001) and Welsh LADs (Table 
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4: β = -0.13, SE = 0.03, p < 0.001). The results for model 2 indicated that Openness negatively 
predicted Brexit votes (Table 4: β = -0.61, SE = 0.04, p < 0.001), Trump votes (Table 5: β = -
0.43, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001), and Trump gains (Table 6: β = -0.47, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001). 
Conscientiousness showed no effect on Brexit votes (Table 4), but had a small and negative 
effect on Trump votes (Table 5: β = -0.08, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001) and Trump gains (Table 6: β 
= -0.11, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001). In model 3, which tested Neuroticism, Openness and 
Conscientiousness together, the results revealed similar effects for the traits with the exception 
that the negative effect of Conscientiousness became slightly positive and non-significant in 
both countries.  
Models 4, 5, and 6 represent relatively conservative tests because we not only consider 
political attitudes (liberal attitudes) but also those regional socio-economic conditions (e.g., 
historical industry patterns and current economic hardship and education levels) that might be 
interrelated, and may actually “co-develop” over time, with regional Neuroticism (Obschonka 
et al., 2017b). The positive correlations between regional Neuroticism and such control 
variables (Tables 2 and 3) are in line with such an assumption.  
The results for model 4 indicated that historical industrial structure had a positive effect 
on Brexit votes (Table 4: β = 0.10, SE = 0.04, p < 0.01), Trump votes (Table 5: β = 0.06, SE = 
0.02, p < 0.001), and Trump gains (Table 6: β = 0.09, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001).  
Models 5 and 6 include the socio-economic controls capturing race, recent economic 
hardship, political attitudes, and education levels. In model 5, the liberal political attitude of the 
regional populace negatively predicted Brexit votes (Table 4: β = -0.37, SE = 0.04, p < 0.001) 
and Trump votes (Table 5: β = -0.69, SE = 0.01, p < 0.001), but positively predicted Trump 
gains (Table 6: β = 0.13, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001). The differing result of liberal political attitude 
on Trump votes and gains needs a short explanation. The raw correlation of liberalism and 
Trump gains is -.3, so the Trump gains were smaller in liberal regions, but the additional control 
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for Openness reversed this relationship so that Trump gains were larger in liberal areas. Among 
the other control variables in these models, the share of white people positively predicted Brexit 
votes (Table 4: β = 0.14, SE = 0.05, p < 0.01), Trump votes (Table 5: β = 0.44, SE = 0.01, p < 
0.001), and Trump gains (Table 6: β = 0.36, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001) in model 5. This effect was 
no longer significant in model 6 in the UK analysis. Model 5 also revealed that unemployment 
positively predicted Brexit votes (Table 4: β = 0.22, SE = 0.04, p < 0.001), negatively predicts 
Trump votes (Table 5: β = -0.05, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001), and did not predict Trump gains (Table 
6: β = 0.04, SE = 0.03, p > 0.05). Earnings, in turn, negatively predicted Brexit votes (Table 4: 
β = -0.15, SE = 0.05, p < 0.01), Trump votes (Table 5: β = -0.11, SE = 0.01, p < 0.001), and 
Trump gains (Table 6: β = -0.29, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001).  
Finally, model 6 shows that high education had a negative effect on Brexit votes (Table 
4: β = -0.60, SE = 0.04, p < 0.001), Trump votes (Table 5: β = -0.14, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001, and 
Trump gains (Table 6: β = -0.63, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001). We observed that the relationship 
between the Big Five traits in these models on the one side, and Brexit votes, Trump votes, and 
Trump gains on the other got weaker when successively including more control variables 
(except for the effect of Conscientiousness).  
[Tables 4, 5, and 6 about here] 
 Taken together, the results support the assumption that Neuroticism was positively 
related to voting behavior in both the Brexit referendum and Trump election. This effect was 
robust when tested against Openness and Conscientiousness (with only Openness showing a 
robust effect). The effect of Neuroticism on Brexit votes diminished when socio-economic 
control variables were included in the analysis, but the effect on support for Trump persisted 
albeit with smaller effect sizes (β ranging from 0.07 to 0.20 depending on model and DV). We 
observed similar results when looking at the subfacets of Neuroticism (Anxiety and Depression) 
(see Table A1 for Brexit votes, A2 for Trump votes, and A3 for Trump gains). We also found 
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indications that historical industrial decline as well as race, liberal attitudes, recent economic 
hardship, and education levels were related to Brexit votes and Trump votes and gains.  
 As a robustness check, we tested whether the results changed when the other Big Five 
traits, Agreeableness and Extraversion, were added to the regressions. These models are shown 
in Online Appendix Table A4 for Brexit votes and in Table A5 for Trump votes and Trump 
gains. In general, the effects of Neuroticism and Openness as identified in our main analysis 
did not change. We also conducted a robustness check regarding the representativeness of the 
regional samples by weighting the individual observations in the Personality samples by age 
and gender when computing the regional traits. These results are displayed in Online Appendix 
Table A6 for both countries. The results do not differ much from our main regression in Tables 
1-3, although the size of the regression coefficients of the traits are slightly reduced in some 
models. 
Discussion 
 The populist political campaigns of 2016 were widely believed to differ from previous 
campaigns, particularly in their focus on generating fears and stoking nationalist fervor. 
Theoretically, campaigns that draw on fear should be particularly compelling to people already 
prone to being anxious. Consequently, regions with high numbers of anxious people should be 
more likely to vote for populist issues (e.g., Brexit) and candidates (e.g., Trump) than regions 
with lower numbers of anxious people. This logic would suggest that regional levels of 
Neuroticism—a dimension not previously associated with voting trends—should be associated 
with support for populist issues and, as a result, influence the geopolitical landscape.  
When comparing the effect of neurotic traits to the effects of other Big Five traits 
(models 1-3 in the regressions), our analyses generally supported this “sleeper effect” 
prediction. Neurotic traits positively predicted share of Brexit and Trump votes and Trump 
gains from Romney when controlling for Openness and Conscientiousness. Particularly in the 
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US analyses, many of these effects of neurotic traits persisted in additional tests controlling for 
regional industrial heritage, political attitude, and socio-economic features. We observed 
stronger effects of neurotic traits when examining Trump gains (from Romney), compared to 
the simple share of Brexit and Trump votes, which underscores our initial assumption that it is 
particularly the shift in voting behavior towards such campaigns addressing fears that reflects 
the interplay between regional Neuroticism and the success of these campaigns.     
One key question remains whether fear can be harnessed by any political campaign or 
whether it is better suited to some positions or policies than to others. For example, could the 
Remain campaign in the UK or Hillary Clinton in the US have pursued fear-based populist 
campaigns as successfully as those pursued by the Leave and Trump campaigns? We do not 
have any direct evidence to address this question but recent theory and research provides 
indirect evidence to suggest that campaigns built on fear and threat are better suited to 
conservative campaigns than liberal ones. Specifically, theoretical work suggests that 
existential needs to reduce threat are associated with political conservatism (Jost, Glaser, 
Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) and a preponderance of empirical evidence suggests that 
individuals’ subjective perceptions of threat, as well as objectively threatening circumstances, 
lead to shifts toward conservatism (Jost, Stern, Rule, & Sterling, 2017). Concomitantly, 
experimentally increasing individuals’ feelings of physical safety leads to shifts away from 
conservatism (Napier, Huang, Vonasch, & Bargh, in press). In short, the activation of fear in 
the electorate would seem to be suited more to conservative positions than to liberal positions. 
Our study contributes to a wide range of research demonstrating important effects of 
Neuroticism on various socio-economic outcomes at the individual (Barlow et al., 2014) and 
regional levels; regional levels of Neuroticism predict lower economic resilience at times of 
major recession (Obschonka et al., 2016), low mental and physical health (Rentfrow, Jokela, & 
Lamb, 2015), and substantial costs for society (Lahey, 2009). An analysis of the concrete 
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economic costs to society (e.g., health-service uptake in primary and secondary mental-health 
care, out-of-pocket costs, production losses) associated with Neuroticism concluded that they 
are “enormous and exceed those of common mental disorders” (p. 1086; Cuijperset al., 2010). 
 The established associations between regional Neuroticism and so many consequential 
outcomes raise the question of how the regional differences in Neuroticism and other traits get 
established in the first place and then maintained over time. A number of mechanisms have 
been proposed (Rentfrow et al., 2008) but such research is still scarce. In the case of regional 
variation in Neuroticism there is evidence that present-day Neuroticism may be associated with 
major historical events, such as the Industrial Revolution (Obschonka et al., 2017b) or mass 
societal trauma, such as the bombing campaigns of the Second World War (Obschonka et al., 
2017a). 
 Clearly more work is needed to understand both the causes and consequences of regional 
differences in Neuroticism. Future research could take a closer look, for example, at the 
potential interplay between the personality structure of candidates (e.g., Obschonka & Fisch, in 
press) and regional personality patterns. One key message of the present research is that the 
consequences of regional Neuroticism may remain hidden until certain conditions are met. For 
example, the regions that are high on Neuroticism in 2016 were likely to be high on Neuroticism 
during previous elections and votes too (in fact, our measurement of regional Neuroticism 
rested on this assumption). However, we argue that it was not until the 2016 populist campaigns 
were launched that the potential effects of regional Neuroticism were expressed. This finding 
raises the possibility that there may be other regional characteristics that have the potential to 
influence geopolitical events but the necessary conditions have not yet materialized.    
Conclusion 
 Our analyses provide support for the widespread account of the appeal of the populist 
messages promoted by the Brexit and Trump campaigns. Consistent with the idea that populist 
17 
 
campaigns played on the fears of the voters, those regions high in Neuroticism were more likely 
to vote in the populist direction. The role of regional Neuroticism in predicting voting behavior 
has not been identified before, suggesting that it could have been a latent factor lying dormant 
until the right conditions—in this case populist political campaigns—were realized. In other 
words, Neuroticism seems to exert a “sleeper effect” with the potential to have a profound 
impact on the geopolitical landscape, especially in light of the rise of populism across the globe. 
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Table 1: Overview of variables and data sources 
 US UK 
Voting Trump votes: 2016 Republican two-party 
vote share 
Trump gains: Gain in the Republican two-
party vote share from 2012 to 2016  
Source 2012 data: OpenDataSoft (2016)  
Source 2016 data: Gifthub (2017) 
 
Share voting leave 
Source: UK Electoral commission (2016)  
Trait Neuroticism Gosling-Potter Internet project BBC UK Lab dataset 
Item scales ranging from 1=disagree 
strongly to 5=agree strongly 
 
Trait Anxiety Gosling-Potter Internet project BBC UK Lab dataset 
Items scales ranging from 1=disagree 
strongly to 5=agree strongly 
 
Trait Depression Gosling-Potter Internet project BBC UK Lab dataset 
Item scales ranging from 1=disagree 
strongly to 5=agree strongly 
 
Population 
density 
Population per square mile 
Source: 2010 US Census 
Population per square km 
Source: 2011 Census of England and Wales 
Source: 2011 Census of Scotland 
 
Scotland --- Dummy: 1=Scottish county 
 
Wales --- Dummy: 1=Welsh county 
 
Historical 
industry structure 
Employment share in mining and 
manufacturing in 1970 
Source: 1970 Census of Population and 
Housing (ICPSR 7507) 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPS
R/studies/24722 
Employment share in mining and 
manufacturing in 1971 
Source: Source: Census of England and 
Wales SAS28, Downloaded from 
http://casweb.ukdataservice.ac.uk/step0.cfm 
Source: Census of Scotland SAS28, 
Downloaded from 
http://casweb.ukdataservice.ac.uk/step0.cfm 
   
Liberal Regional average of the variable: “I see 
myself as someone who is politically 
liberal” ranging from 1=strongly disagree 
to 5=strongly agree 
Source: Gosling-Potter Internet project 
Regional average of the variable: “I see 
myself as someone who is politically 
liberal” ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 
5=strongly agree 
Source: Gosling-Potter Internet project 
White Population share white 2010-2014 
Source: 2010 ACS five-year estimates 
Population share white 2011 
Source: Census of England and Wales, 
KS201EW 
Source: Census of Scotland DC2101SC 
 
Unemployment  Unemployment rate 2015 
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Unemployment rate 2011 
Source: Census of England and Wales 
KS601EW to KS603EW 
Source: Census of Scotland QS601SC_CA 
 
Earnings Yearly income per capita in $, 2010-2014 
Source: 2010 ACS five-year estimates 
Weekly income 2011 in £, 2011 
Source: Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings 
 
High education Population share (25 years or above) with 
bachelor degree or higher, 2010-2014 
Source: 2010 ACS five-year estimates 
Population share (16 years or above) with 
Level 4 qualifications or above, 2011 
Source: 2011 Census of England and Wales 
KS501EW 
Source 2011 Census of Scotland KS501SC 
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Table 2: Correlations in UK 
 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14  
1 Brexit Vote: Leave 53.17 10.42 1.00               
2 Neuroticism1 2.97 0.05 0.26 1.00              
3 Anxiety1 2.96 0.05 0.36 0.92 1.00             
4 Depression1 2.87 0.07 0.11 0.84 0.59 1.00            
5 Openness1 3.66 0.07 -0.67 -0.14 -0.36 0.13 1.00           
6 Conscientiousness1 3.66 0.06 0.31 -0.43 -0.22 -0.62 -0.43 1.00          
7 Population density 1,491.85 2,248.11 -0.42 0.11 -0.10 0.38 0.60 -0.55 1.00         
8 Scotland 0.08 0.28 -0.41 -0.07 -0.04 -0.09 0.00 -0.06 -0.14 1.00        
9 Wales 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.11 0.04 0.20 0.01 -0.16 -0.12 -0.08 1.00       
10 Historical industry structure 34.33 12.34 0.34 0.39 0.38 0.36 -0.34 -0.17 -0.03 -0.05 0.00 1.00      
11 Liberal1 2.97 0.21 -0.65 -0.14 -0.25 -0.01 0.62 -0.24 0.49 -0.07 -0.05 -0.35 1.00     
12 White 90.39 12.28 0.35 -0.07 0.10 -0.31 -0.46 0.50 -0.77 0.17 0.13 -0.08 -0.39 1.00    
13 Unemployment  6.13 2.07 0.08 0.49 0.34 0.67 0.09 -0.59 0.44 0.11 0.10 0.44 -0.10 -0.41 1.00   
14 Earnings 490.83 114.56 -0.51 -0.31 -0.36 -0.20 0.41 -0.04 0.38 -0.09 -0.16 -0.28 0.51 -0.31 -0.31 1.00  
15 High education 26.91 7.67 -0.77 -0.42 -0.48 -0.29 0.64 -0.09 0.39 -0.06 -0.09 -0.46 0.70 -0.35 -0.42 0.80 1.00 
 
Notes. Correlations above |0.1| are significant at the 5% level. 1Ranging from 1=low to 5=high. 
  
25 
 
Table 3: Correlations in US 
 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Trump votes 63.40 15.65 1.00              
2 Trump gains 5.22 5.28 0.43 1.00             
3 Neuroticism1 2.93 0.09 0.37 0.44 1.00            
4 Anxiety1 2.91 0.09 0.38 0.45 0.94 1.00           
5 Depression1 2.83 0.1 0.22 0.29 0.85 0.65 1.00          
6 Openness1 3.61 0.09 -0.48 -0.48 -0.20 -0.33 0.09 1.00         
7 Conscientiousness1 3.59 0.08 -0.05 -0.08 -0.38 -0.34 -0.35 -0.06 1.00        
8 Population density 381.93 2150.78 -0.30 -0.18 -0.03 -0.05 0.02 0.24 -0.04 1.00       
9 Historical industry structure 25.36 11.73 0.21 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.19 -0.17 0.08 -0.04 1.00      
10 Liberal1 2.74 0.24 -0.76 -0.30 -0.16 -0.20 -0.03 0.60 -0.15 0.30 -0.17 1.00     
11 White 83.33 15.24 0.55 0.43 0.38 0.40 0.25 -0.23 -0.36 -0.21 0.09 -0.14 1.00    
12 Unemployment  5.55 1.74 -0.07 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.20 -0.03 0.17 -0.09 -0.34 1.00   
13 Earnings 24,666.21 5815.75 -0.35 -0.38 -0.19 -0.20 -0.12 0.35 -0.21 0.26 -0.20 0.46 0.11 -0.49 1.00  
14 High education 21.92 9.56 -0.55 -0.62 -0.36 -0.35 -0.26 0.49 -0.12 0.24 -0.32 0.62 -0.06 -0.44 0.80 1.00 
 
Notes. Correlations above |0.1| are significant at the 5% level. 1Ranging from 1=low to 5=high. 
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Table 4: Effects of Neuroticism on 2016 Brexit votes (leave) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 N O+C N+O+C Industrial heritage Socio-economics I Socio-economics II 
 β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI 
Neuroticism 0.30*** 0.22, 0.38   0.21*** 0.12, 0.29 0.19*** 0.10, 0.27 0.08* 0.02, 0.15 0.01 -0.05, 0.06 
 (0.04)    (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
Openness   -0.61*** -0.69, -0.52 -0.52*** -0.61, -0.43 -0.48*** -0.57, -0.39 -0.29*** -0.37, -0.21 -0.13*** -0.18, -0.07 
   (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.03)  
Conscientiousness   -0.07 -0.15, 0.01 0.05 -0.03, 0.14 0.08 -0.00, 0.16 0.13*** 0.05, 0.20 0.08* 0.02, 0.14 
   (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  
Population density -0.53*** -0.60, -0.46 -0.16*** -0.25, -0.07 -0.16*** -0.25, -0.08 -0.17*** -0.25, -0.08 -0.05 -0.15, 0.05 -0.04 -0.12, 0.04 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  
Scotland -0.47*** -0.53, -0.41 -0.44*** -0.50, -0.37 -0.42*** -0.48, -0.35 -0.41*** -0.48, -0.34 -0.49*** -0.55, -0.44 -0.47*** -0.52, -0.42 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.02)  
Wales -0.13*** -0.18, -0.07 -0.06* -0.11, -0.00 -0.06* -0.11, -0.01 -0.05* -0.10, -0.01 -0.10*** -0.14, -0.06 -0.09*** -0.13, -0.06 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Historical ind. structure       0.10** 0.03, 0.16 -0.02 -0.08, 0.04 -0.04 -0.08, 0.01 
       (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  
Liberal         -0.30*** -0.37, -0.23 -0.15*** -0.20, -0.10 
         (0.04)  (0.03)  
White         0.14** 0.05, 0.23 0.04 -0.03, 0.11 
         (0.05)  (0.04)  
Unemployment         0.22*** 0.14, 0.31   
         (0.04)    
Earnings         -0.15** -0.24, -0.06   
         (0.05)    
High education           -0.60*** -0.68, -0.52 
           (0.04)  
Constant 0.00 -0.07, 0.07 -0.00 -0.06, 0.06 -0.00 -0.06, 0.06 -0.00 -0.06, 0.06 0.00 -0.04, 0.04 0.00 -0.03, 0.03 
 (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Observations 379  379  379  379  379  379  
Adjusted R2 0.487  0.627  0.656  0.662  0.804  0.882  
F-test 108.5  133  108.4  93.54  118.2  156.6  
Notes. OLS regressions. Standardized regression coefficients and 95%CI for the standardized regression coefficients are given. Robust standard errors in parentheses are given. DV in 
models 1-6: Share Brexit leave votes.  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05  
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Table 5: Effects of Neuroticism on 2016 US Presidential election (Trump votes)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 N O+C N+O+C Industrial heritage Socio-economics I Socio-economics II 
 β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI 
Neuroticism 0.36*** 0.32, 0.40   0.30*** 0.26, 0.34 0.28*** 0.24, 0.32 0.10*** 0.07, 0.13 0.07*** 0.04, 0.10 
 (0.02)    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Openness   -0.43*** -0.48, -0.39 -0.37*** -0.41, -0.33 -0.36*** -0.40, -0.32 0.10*** 0.07, 0.13 0.10*** 0.08, 0.13 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Conscientiousness   -0.08*** -0.13, -0.04 0.03 -0.01, 0.08 0.02 -0.02, 0.07 0.04** 0.02, 0.07 0.04** 0.01, 0.06 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Population density -0.29** -0.47, -0.10 -0.20* -0.36, -0.04 -0.20** -0.35, -0.05 -0.20** -0.35, -0.05 0.01 -0.01, 0.03 0.01 -0.01, 0.02 
 (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Historical ind. structure       0.06*** 0.03, 0.10 0.02* 0.00, 0.05 0.01 -0.02, 0.03 
       (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Liberal         -0.69*** -0.71, -0.66 -0.66*** -0.69, -0.62 
         (0.01)  (0.02)  
White         0.44*** 0.41, 0.47 0.46*** 0.43, 0.48 
         (0.01)  (0.01)  
Unemployment         -0.05*** -0.08, -0.02   
         (0.02)    
Earnings         -0.11*** -0.14, -0.08   
         (0.01)    
High education           -0.14*** -0.17, -0.10 
           (0.02)  
Constant -0.00 -0.04, 0.04 -0.00 -0.04, 0.04 -0.00 -0.03, 0.03 -0.00 -0.03, 0.03 -0.00 -0.02, 0.02 -0.00 -0.02, 0.02 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Observations 2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  
Adjusted R2 0.216  0.269  0.343  0.346  0.794  0.796  
F-test 189.6  183.8  214  175  966.9  1210  
Notes. OLS regressions. Standardized regression coefficients and 95%CI for the standardized regression coefficients are given. Robust standard errors in parentheses are given. DV 
in models 1-6: Trump votes=2016 Republican two-party vote share.  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 6: Effects of Neuroticism on 2016 US Presidential election (Trump gains)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 N O+C N+O+C Industrial heritage Socio-economics I Socio-economics II 
 β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI 
Neuroticism 0.43*** 0.39, 0.47   0.37*** 0.33, 0.41 0.34*** 0.30, 0.39 0.20*** 0.16, 0.25 0.09*** 0.05, 0.13 
 (0.02)    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Openness   -0.47*** -0.51, -0.43 -0.39*** -0.43, -0.35 -0.38*** -0.42, -0.34 -0.33*** -0.37, -0.28 -0.26*** -0.30, -0.23 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Conscientiousness   -0.11*** -0.14, -0.07 0.03 -0.00, 0.07 0.02 -0.02, 0.06 0.06** 0.02, 0.10 0.04* 0.00, 0.07 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Population density -0.16** -0.27, -0.05 -0.07 -0.15, 0.01 -0.07* -0.14, -0.01 -0.07* -0.14, -0.01 0.02 -0.00, 0.05 0.02** 0.01, 0.03 
 (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Historical ind. structure       0.09*** 0.06, 0.13 0.07*** 0.03, 0.10 0.00 -0.03, 0.03 
       (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Liberal         0.13*** 0.08, 0.18 0.31*** 0.27, 0.35 
         (0.02)  (0.02)  
White         0.36*** 0.32, 0.41 0.36*** 0.32, 0.39 
         (0.02)  (0.02)  
Unemployment         0.04 -0.01, 0.10   
         (0.03)    
Earnings         -0.29*** -0.33, -0.24   
         (0.02)    
High education           -0.63*** -0.67, -0.58 
           (0.02)  
Constant 0.00 -0.04, 0.04 0.00 -0.04, 0.04 0.00 -0.03, 0.03 0.00 -0.03, 0.03 0.00 -0.03, 0.03 0.00 -0.03, 0.03 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  
Observations 2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  
Adjusted R2 0.216  0.245  0.356  0.363  0.480  0.607  
F-test 219.7  199.6  217.6  191.5  185.9  357.7   
Notes. OLS regressions. Standardized regression coefficients and 95%CI for the standardized regression coefficients are given. Robust standard errors in parentheses are given. DV 
in models 1-6: Trump Gains=Gain in the Republican two-party vote share between 2012 and 2016. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Figure 1. Brexit votes (leave) across UK LADs. 
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Figure 2. Regional distribution of Neuroticism across UK LADs. 
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Figure 3. Trump gains (= Gain in Republican two-party vote share between the 2012 and the 2016 election) across US counties. White 
areas are counties that were dropped because of too few observations in the personality data set. 
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Figure 4. Regional distribution of Neuroticism across US counties. White areas are counties that were dropped because of too few 
observations in the personality data set. 
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Online Supplementary Materials 
 
METHODS 
Regional level. We conduct our analysis at the county level in the US. In the UK, we 
analyze the Local Authority District (LAD) level; there we focus only on regions in Scotland, 
England, and Wales because the control variables are not available for Northern Ireland. 
Personality data. For the UK, personality data (N=417,217) come from a large Internet-
based survey designed and administered between 2009 and 2011 in collaboration with the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC UK Lab project; see Rentfrow, Jokela, & Lamb, 2015; for details 
of sample selection see Online Supplementary Methods). Between 2009 and 2011, approximately 
588,014 individuals completed the survey. Participants reported the postcode in which they lived 
at the time. The postcode information was used to determine the LAD in which participants lived. 
We excluded participants with missing personality data and participants who could not be allocated 
to LADs. To generate stable estimates of the personality scores, each LAD needed to have at least 
100 respondents to be included (only the Isles of Scilly did not). These criteria resulted in a total 
sample of 417,217 respondents in 379 LADs. The LAD sample size ranged from 115 (Orkney 
Islands) to 6,201 (Birmingham), with a mean of 1,101 (SD = 816). The mean age of respondents 
was 36 years (SD = 14 years) and 64% of the respondents were female. See [removed for blind 
review] and [removed for blind review] for more information about the collection procedure, 
sample structure, and representativeness of the data. 
For the US, we use personality data from the Gosling-Potter Internet Project that started in 
1999. The project collects personality data via a noncommercial Internet website, which can be 
reached via several channels (e.g., search engines, unsolicited links on other webpages). People 
can voluntarily participate in this study by completing a questionnaire on socio-demographic 
variables, personality traits, and zip codes. As an incentive, participants received a personality 
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evaluation based on their responses. For this research, we used a dataset comprising 3,669,165 
participants collected from 2003 (the first time respondents were asked to provide their ZIP code) 
to 2015. Applying the same selection critieria as those used for the UK resulted in a sample of 
3,167,041 respondents from 2,082 counties.1 The county sample sizes ranged from 100 (Kalkaska, 
Michigan) to 78,789 (Los Angeles, California) with a mean of 1,521 (SD = 3,713). The mean age 
of respondents was 26 years (SD = 12 years) and 64% of the respondents were female. 
In both countries, the personality data were collected using the Big Five Inventory (BFI; 
John & Srivastava, 1999), which consists of 44 items (5-point Likert scale, 1 = disagree strongly, 
5 = agree strongly) (see also Rentfrow et al., 2015). We focus on neurotic traits, namely 
Neuroticism as a broad Big Five trait, and Anxiety and Depression as established sub-facets of 
Neuroticism. Following Soto and John (2009), Neuroticism was measured with eight items, 
Anxiety with four items, and Depression with two items. The scales yielded acceptable levels of 
internal consistency (e.g., α =.84 in the US and α =.83 in GB for Neuroticism). We aggregated the 
individual-level observations based on the LAD/county in which the participants lived when the 
survey took place. Across LADs in the UK, Neuroticism had a mean of 2.97 (SD = 0.05), Anxiety 
had a mean of 2.96 (SD = 0.05), and Depression had a mean of 2.87 (SD = 0.07). Across counties 
in the US, Neuroticism had a mean of 2.93 (SD = 0.09), Anxiety had a mean of 2.91 (SD = 0.09), 
and Depression had a mean of 2.83 (SD = 0.10).  
As mentioned above, we compare the neurotic traits to the role of Openness (UK: M = 3.66, 
SD = 0.07; US: M = 3.61, SD = 0.09) and Conscientiousness (UK: M = 3.66, SD = 0.06; US: M = 
3.59, SD = 0.08), which are the established regional personality correlates of voting behavior. 
                                                 
1 1,048 counties were dropped because of a sample size of less than 100. These counties are mainly rural areas in the 
Midwest and Mountain Regions. We additionally exclude all 29 Alaska counties because election results are not 
available at the county level in Alaska. The final sample still covers roughly two thirds of the US counties. 
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These data for Openness and Conscientiousness also come from the personality data sets described 
above. 
One potential issue of the personality data is representativeness because the data were 
collected via an Internet-based survey. To assess the representativeness of the region-level 
samples, we compared the demographic characteristics of the personality samples with data from 
the 2011 UK Census data and American Community Survey (2010 ACS 5yr estimates). We 
correlated the percentage of respondents in several major demographic categories from the 
personality sample with the percentage of the population from that group within each region. The 
representativeness of our samples varied considerably across variables. Regarding race, the 
correlation between the regional share of White/Caucasian respondents and White/Caucasian 
population share was 0.94 in both countries. The correlation between the respondent share with a 
bachelor degree or higher and the respective population share was 0.78 in the UK and 0.52 in the 
US. The correlation between the regional share of female respondents and female population 
share was 0.34 in the UK and 0.06 in the US. With regard to age, the correlations of the 
population share in specific age groups at the regional level in the UK were 0.22 (under 20 
years), 0.64 (20-34 years), 0.83 (35-49 years), 0.81 (50-64 years) and 0.76 (over 65 years). In the 
US the correlations were -0.01 (under 18 years), 0.62 (18-24 years), 0.27 (25-44 years), 0.40 (45-
64 years) and 0.38 (over 65 years). In short, the Personality samples are fairly representative 
regarding race and education but not regarding age and gender. We also address this concern 
regarding the representativeness of the samples with a robustness check in which we weight the 
individual respondents in the personality sample – which are used for the computation of the 
regional neurotic traits – by age and gender. The results of this robustness check did not differ 
much from our main regressions (and are reported in detail in Online Appendix Table A6). 
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Note also that the personality data were collected via self-reports and were measured at a 
slightly different time than the voting behavior. To the extent that these factors diminished the 
validity of the personality estimates, the effects reported here are likely to be diminished too, so 
any effects should be interpreted as conservative estimates. However, indirect evidence for the 
validity of the personality estimates is provided by previous research undertaken at regional 
levels, which has shown convergence between analyses based on self-reports and informant 
reports (e.g., Gebauer et al., 2014) and has demonstrated reasonably strong levels of state-level 
stability  Elleman, Condon, Russin, & Revelle, 2017; Rentfrow et al., 2013).  
Election data. We focus on two kinds of DVs. The first is the simple vote share for  
Brexit and Trump, testing the idea that regions high on Neuroticism were particularly likely to be 
swayed by populist campaigns. This DV mirrors those used in previous analyses and allows us to 
test whether the 2016 elections differed from previous ones in now showing associations with 
regional Neuroticism where previous votes had been associated only with regional Openness and 
Conscientiousness.   
The second kind of DV, which we can measure only in the US analyses, focuses on that 
part of Trump’s vote that is not merely due to him being the Republican candidate. In other words, 
we examine the shift to Trump, over and above the region’s historical tendency to vote for 
Republican candidates. We thus aim at capturing the specific impact (and success) of Trump’s 
populist campaign, with its clearer focus on fears and (potential) losses than seen in previous 
campaigns (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). It has been suggested that it was these particular shifts to 
Trump (e.g., in battlefield states) that lead to his victory (The Washington Post, 2016). 
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Data on the Brexit results are available at the LAD level from the UK Electoral 
Commission (2016). The dependent variable was the share of votes for Brexit among the valid 
votes (M = 53.17%, SD = 10.42).  
US election data come from open data sources (Github 2017; OpenDataSoft 2016). For the 
first dependent variable we use the share of Trump vote which is calculated as the two-party vote 
share for the Republicans in 2016 (henceforth: Trump votes) (M = 63.4, SD = 15.65).2 The two-
party vote share ignores votes going to third parties such as the Green or Liberal Party.  
To examine the shift to Trump over and above the existing tendency to vote Republican, 
we compute the change of the Republican two-party vote from 2012 to 2016. For example if Trump 
as the Republican candidate in 2016 had a 50% two-party vote share and Romney as the 2012 
candidate had a 40% two-party vote share, the gain would be 10%. This gain in the two-party vote 
share (henceforth: Trump gains) is our second dependent variable for the US analysis (M = 5.22, 
SD = 5.28)3. Naturally, such a gain equals the corresponding loss of the Democratic candidate. 
Control variables. We control for an array of variables which could potentially explain 
voting behavior.  
First, we control for population density because voters in regions with higher population 
density (e.g. larger cities) tend not to vote for conservative candidates. In the UK analysis, we also 
included country dummies for Scotland and Wales. Scotland and Wales are special cases because 
of simmering independence movements and local culture. For example, there are strong economic 
                                                 
2 We report the average of the Republican two-party vote share at the county level. There are many more counties 
that voted in favor of Trump than in favor of Clinton. But many of the counties Trump won are less populous 
counties in rural areas. In contrast, many of the populous counties were won by Clinton as the overall popular vote. 
3 This mean and standard deviation of the gain in the Republican two-party vote share was computed only for the 
2,082 counties for which we have a sufficiently large number of respondents (100+ respondents) in the personality 
data set. This corresponds to roughly two thirds of all US counties.  
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motives in Scotland to remain in the EU even after a potential independence from the UK because 
a small country, like Scotland disproportionally gains from free trade in the EU (Schiff, 1997). 
Second, we consider the regions’ industrial heritage. Recent studies and popular narratives 
suggest that voters in the industrialized heartlands of the UK and US were particularly likely to 
vote for Brexit and Donald Trump. One reason could be that the industrialized areas (e.g., the Rust 
Belt in the US) are in a long phase of decline (Autor, Dorn, & Hansen, 2013; Autor et al., 2017). 
One major promise of the Trump campaign was a policy shift away from free trade to protect jobs 
in the industrialized heartland (“bringing back the manufacturing”). Additionally, popular 
narratives suggest that the workforce in these industries viewed themselves with a lot of pride and 
the loss of this pride during the industrial decline might have made them susceptible to populist 
campaigns (see also Inglehart & Norris, 2016). To capture the effect of the historical industrial 
decline in the old industrial centers, we include the employment share in manufacturing and mining 
in the US for the year 1970 (M = 25.3%, SD = 11.76) and in the UK for the year 1971 as controls 
(M = 34.33%, SD = 12.34). We chose data from the early 1970s over later time periods because 
they provide good estimates of the industrial structure before de-industrialization accelerated from 
the 1980s onwards. 
Third, we consider political attitudes of the regional populace. Prior research has shown 
that people who consider themselves as liberal tend to vote for left-wing parties and people who 
consider themselves as conservatives tend to vote for right-wing parties (e.g., Langer & Cohen, 
2005). So here we examine whether neurotic traits add any incremental predictive validity beyond 
a simple effect of political attitudes. Specifically, we include a control variable reflecting the liberal 
political attitude of the regional populace (single item: “I see myself as someone who is politically 
liberal”, ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree). The individual-level data come 
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from the Gosling-Potter Internet Project in both countries and were aggregated to the 
corresponding regional levels in the US (M = 2.74, SD = 0.24) and UK (M = 2.97, SD = 0.21). 
Fourth, the Trump and Brexit campaigns were reported to stir up racial tensions with regard 
to migration (e.g., Major, Blodorn, & Blascovich, 2016) and racial composition of the population 
can predict voting behavior (e.g. Rentfrow et al., 2015; Autor et al., 2015). We therefore included 
the share of white inhabitants (US: M = 83.29%, SD = 15.24; UK M = 90.39%, SD = 12.28).  
Fifth, we consider current economic hardship in the region. Voters suffering from poor 
economic conditions can voice their dissent with current economic policy by voting for the 
opposition (Republicans in the 2016 US election) or the Brexit campaign. We include the 
unemployment share and earnings in our analysis. In the US case, we use the 2015 unemployment 
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (M = 5.56%, SD = 1.74) and the yearly income per capita 
in the 2010-2014 period from the American Community Survey (ACS) (M = $24.688, SD = 5.829). 
In the UK, we use the unemployment data from the 2011 Census (M = 6.13%, SD = 2.07) and the 
weekly income in 2011 from Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (M = £490.83, SD = 114.56). 
Finally, we also use the educational attainment of the population as a control variable 
because education can also predict election results (Rentfrow et al., 2013). We expect educational 
attainment to be important for two reasons. First, better educated people have profited in the last 
decades from free trade in terms of better job chances and higher earnings (Autor, 2014). This 
makes it more likely that they will vote against Trump and Brexit, which have isolationistic 
tendencies. Second, populist campaigns may offer simplified solutions to complex problems and 
better educated people might find these simplified solutions unrealistic and thus vote against these 
campaigns (Seligson, 2007). In the US, we use the population share with a bachelor degree or 
higher. The data come from the 2010 ACS 5yr estimates in the US (M = 21.92%, SD = 9.56). In 
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the UK, we use the population share with NVQ level 4 qualification or above, roughly equivalent 
to degree level. The data come from the 2011 Census (M = 26.91%, SD = 7.67).  
All variables and their sources are reported in Table 1. 
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Table A1: Effects of Anxiety and Depression on 2016 Brexit votes (leave) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 N O+C N+O+C Industrial heritage Socio-economics I Socio-economics II 
 β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI 
Panel A (Anxiety)             
Anxiety 0.30*** 0.22, 0.37   0.14** 0.05, 0.22 0.12** 0.03, 0.20 0.04 -0.02, 0.10 -0.01 -0.06, 0.03 
 (0.04)    (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.02)  
Openness   -0.61*** -0.69, -0.52 -0.53*** -0.63, -0.44 -0.48*** -0.58, -0.38 -0.29*** -0.37, -0.21 -0.13*** -0.19, -0.07 
   (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.03)  
Conscientiousness   -0.07 -0.15, 0.01 -0.00 -0.09, 0.08 0.03 -0.05, 0.11 0.11** 0.03, 0.18 0.07* 0.01, 0.13 
   (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 379  379  379  379  379  379  
Adjusted R2 0.486  0.627  0.639  0.648  0.801  0.882  
             
Panel B (Depression)             
Depression 0.35*** 0.27, 0.43   0.33*** 0.25, 0.42 0.31*** 0.23, 0.40 0.15*** 0.07, 0.22 0.03 -0.03, 0.10 
 (0.04)    (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
Openness   -0.61*** -0.69, -0.52 -0.52*** -0.61, -0.44 -0.49*** -0.58, -0.41 -0.31*** -0.38, -0.23 -0.13*** -0.19, -0.07 
   (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  
Conscientiousness   -0.07 -0.15, 0.01 0.13** 0.05, 0.22 0.14*** 0.06, 0.23 0.15*** 0.07, 0.23 0.09** 0.03, 0.15 
   (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 379  379  379  379  379  379  
Adjusted R2 0.496  0.627  0.688  0.690  0.810  0.882  
Notes. OLS regressions. Standardized regression coefficients are given. Robust standard errors in parentheses are given. DV in models 1-6: Share Brexit leave votes. Panel A: 
Models with Anxiety as IV. Panel B: Models with Depression as IV. The control variables are the same as in Table 4 but are suppressed due to brevity. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05  
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Table A2: Effects of Anxiety and Depression on 2016 US Presidential election (Trump votes)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 N O+C N+O+C Industrial heritage Socio-economics I Socio-economics II 
 β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI 
Panel A (Anxiety)             
Anxiety 0.37*** 0.33, 0.40   0.26*** 0.22, 0.30 0.23*** 0.19, 0.28 0.09*** 0.06, 0.12 0.07*** 0.04, 0.10 
 (0.02)    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Openness   -0.43*** -0.48, -0.39 -0.34*** -0.38, -0.30 -0.34*** -0.38, -0.29 0.12*** 0.09, 0.14 0.12*** 0.09, 0.14 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Conscientiousness   -0.08*** -0.13, -0.04 0.01 -0.03, 0.05 -0.00 -0.05, 0.04 0.03** 0.01, 0.06 0.03** 0.01, 0.06 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  
Adjusted R2 0.222  0.269  0.320  0.325  0.793  0.796  
             
Panel B (Depression)             
Depression 0.23*** 0.19, 0.27   0.27*** 0.24, 0.31 0.25*** 0.21, 0.29 0.08*** 0.05, 0.11 0.05** 0.02, 0.08 
 (0.02)    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Openness   -0.43*** -0.48, -0.39 -0.45*** -0.50, -0.41 -0.44*** -0.48, -0.40 0.07*** 0.04, 0.10 0.09*** 0.06, 0.11 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Conscientiousness   -0.08*** -0.13, -0.04 0.01 -0.03, 0.06 -0.00 -0.04, 0.04 0.03** 0.01, 0.06 0.03* 0.00, 0.05 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  
Adjusted R2 0.140  0.269  0.334  0.339  0.792  0.795  
Notes. OLS regressions. Standardized regression coefficients and 95%CI for the standardized regression coefficients are given. Robust standard errors in parentheses are given. DV 
in models 1-6: Trump votes=2016 Republican two-party vote share. Panel A: Models with Anxiety as IV. Panel B: Models with Depression as IV. The control variables are the 
same as in Tables 5 and 6 but are suppressed due to brevity. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table A3: Effects of Anxiety and Depression on 2016 US Presidential election (Trump gains)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 N O+C N+O+C Industrial heritage Socio-economics I Socio-economics II 
 β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI 
Panel A (Anxiety)             
Anxiety 0.44*** 0.40, 0.48   0.33*** 0.28, 0.37 0.29*** 0.25, 0.34 0.14*** 0.10, 0.19 0.05** 0.02, 0.09 
 (0.02)    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Openness   -0.47*** -0.51, -0.43 -0.35*** -0.39, -0.31 -0.35*** -0.39, -0.30 -0.30*** -0.35, -0.26 -0.25*** -0.29, -0.22 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Conscientiousness   -0.11*** -0.14, -0.07 0.01 -0.03, 0.05 -0.01 -0.05, 0.03 0.03 -0.01, 0.07 0.02 -0.01, 0.06 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  
Adjusted R2 0.222  0.245  0.325  0.336  0.466  0.604  
             
Panel B (Depression)             
Depression 0.30*** 0.25, 0.34   0.34*** 0.30, 0.38 0.31*** 0.27, 0.35 0.20*** 0.16, 0.25 0.09*** 0.05, 0.12 
 (0.02)    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Openness   -0.47*** -0.51, -0.43 -0.49*** -0.53, -0.45 -0.47*** -0.51, -0.43 -0.39*** -0.44, -0.34 -0.29*** -0.33, -0.25 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Conscientiousness   -0.11*** -0.14, -0.07 0.01 -0.03, 0.05 -0.01 -0.05, 0.03 0.05** 0.02, 0.09 0.04* 0.00, 0.07 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  
Adjusted R2 0.118  0.245  0.346  0.357  0.483  0.607  
 
Notes. OLS regressions. Standardized regression coefficients and 95%CI for the standardized regression coefficients are given. Robust standard errors in parentheses are given. DV 
in models 1-6: Trump gains=Gain in the Republican two-party vote share between 2012 and 2016. Panel A: Models with Anxiety as IV. Panel B: Models with Depression as IV. 
The control variables are the same as in Tables 5 and 6 but are suppressed due to brevity. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table A4: Robustness Checks with all Big Five traits: Effects of Neuroticism on 2016 Brexit votes (leave) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 N O+C N+O+C Industrial heritage Socio-economics I Socio-economics II 
 β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI 
Neuroticism 0.30*** 0.22, 0.38   0.14** 0.05, 0.23 0.12** 0.03, 0.21 0.05 -0.01, 0.11 -0.01 -0.07, 0.04 
 (0.04)    (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
Openness   -0.52*** -0.60, -0.43 -0.48*** -0.57, -0.40 -0.44*** -0.54, -0.35 -0.29*** -0.37, -0.21 -0.13*** -0.18, -0.07 
   (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.03)  
Conscientiousness   -0.04 -0.12, 0.04 0.02 -0.07, 0.11 0.05 -0.04, 0.13 0.14*** 0.07, 0.22 0.11*** 0.05, 0.17 
   (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  
Agreeableness   0.05 -0.03, 0.13 0.07 -0.01, 0.15 0.06 -0.02, 0.15 -0.06 -0.14, 0.02 -0.09** -0.15, -0.03 
   (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  
Extraversion   -0.21*** -0.28, -0.15 -0.15*** -0.23, -0.07 -0.15*** -0.23, -0.07 -0.04 -0.11, 0.02 -0.00 -0.05, 0.05 
   (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 379  379  379  379  379  379  
Adjusted R2 0.487  0.661  0.671  0.677  0.806  0.885  
 
Notes. OLS regressions. Standardized regression coefficients and 95%CI for the standardized regression coefficients are given. Robust standard errors in parentheses are given. DV 
in models 1-6: Share Brexit leave votes. The control variables are the same as in Table 4 but are suppressed due to brevity. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table A5: Robustness Checks with all Big Five traits: Effects of Neuroticism on 2016 US Presidential election (Trump votes and 
Trump gains)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 N O+C N+O+C Industrial heritage Socio-economics I Socio-economics II 
 β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI 
Panel A (Trump             
Neuroticism 0.36*** 0.32, 0.40   0.30*** 0.25, 0.34 0.27*** 0.22, 0.31 0.10*** 0.07, 0.14 0.07*** 0.04, 0.11 
 (0.02)    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Openness   -0.48*** -0.52, - -0.38*** -0.42, -0.34 -0.38*** -0.42, - 0.10*** 0.07, 0.13 0.11*** 0.08, 0.14 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Conscientiousness   0.08** 0.02, 0.13 0.14*** 0.09, 0.19 0.13*** 0.08, 0.19 0.03 -0.00, 0.06 0.02 -0.01, 0.05 
   (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Agreeableness   -0.23*** -0.28, - -0.17*** -0.22, -0.11 -0.18*** -0.24, - 0.03 -0.01, 0.06 0.03 -0.01, 0.06 
   (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Extraversion   -0.06*** -0.10, - 0.05** 0.01, 0.09 0.05* 0.01, 0.09 -0.00 -0.03, 0.02 -0.01 -0.03, 0.02 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  
Adjusted R2 0.216  0.302  0.357  0.362  0.794  0.797  
             
Panel B (Trump             
Neuroticism 0.43*** 0.39, 0.47   0.39*** 0.35, 0.44 0.35*** 0.30, 0.40 0.22*** 0.17, 0.27 0.11*** 0.06, 0.15 
 (0.02)    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  
Openness   -0.50*** -0.55, - -0.38*** -0.42, -0.34 -0.38*** -0.42, - -0.33*** -0.38, - -0.27*** -0.31, -
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Conscientiousness   0.03 -0.02, 0.08 0.11*** 0.06, 0.16 0.10*** 0.05, 0.15 0.11*** 0.06, 0.16 0.09*** 0.05, 0.13 
   (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Agreeableness   -0.19*** -0.24, - -0.11*** -0.16, -0.06 -0.13*** -0.18, - -0.10*** -0.15, - -0.09*** -0.13, -
   (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  
Extraversion   -0.07*** -0.11, - 0.09*** 0.05, 0.13 0.08*** 0.04, 0.12 0.06** 0.02, 0.10 0.06*** 0.03, 0.10 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  2,082  
Adjusted R2 0.216  0.270  0.366  0.375  0.485  0.612  
 
Notes. OLS regressions. Standardized regression coefficients and 95%CI for the standardized regression coefficients are given. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses are given. DV in models 1-6: Panel A: Models with DV Trump votes=2016 Republican two-party vote share. Panel B: Models with DV Trump 
gains=Gain in the Republican two-party vote share between 2012 and 2016. The control variables are the same as in Tables 5 and 6 but are suppressed due to 
brevity. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table A6: Robustness Checks with weighted traits: Effects of weighted Neuroticism on 2016 Brexit votes (leave) and on 2016 US 
Presidential election (Trump votes and Trump gains) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 N O+C N+O+C Industrial heritage Socio-economics I Socio-economics II 
 β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI β (t) 95% CI 
Panel A (Brexit)             
Neuroticism 0.24*** 0.17, 0.32   0.20*** 0.12, 0.27 0.16*** 0.08, 0.24 0.08** 0.02, 0.14 0.00 -0.04, 0.05 
 (0.04)    (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.02)  
Openness   -0.49*** -0.58, - -0.44*** -0.53, -0.36 -0.39*** -0.48, - -0.22*** -0.29, - -0.08** -0.13, -
   (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  
Conscientiousness   -0.01 -0.09, 0.07 0.07 -0.01, 0.16 0.06 -0.02, 0.15 0.09** 0.02, 0.15 0.04 -0.01, 0.09 
   (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.457  0.574  0.606  0.621  0.784  0.875  
             
Panel B (Trump             
Neuroticism 0.24*** 0.20, 0.28   0.19*** 0.15, 0.23 0.16*** 0.12, 0.21 0.06*** 0.04, 0.09 0.05*** 0.02, 0.07 
 (0.02)    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Openness   -0.39*** -0.43, - -0.35*** -0.39, -0.30 -0.33*** -0.38, - 0.05*** 0.02, 0.07 0.05*** 0.03, 0.08 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Conscientiousness   -0.04 -0.09, 0.00 0.05* 0.00, 0.10 0.02 -0.03, 0.07 0.01 -0.02, 0.03 -0.00 -0.03, 0.02 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.145  0.233  0.260  0.272  0.786  0.790 0.145 
             
Panel C (Trump             
Neuroticism 0.29*** 0.25, 0.34   0.30*** 0.25, 0.34 0.26*** 0.21, 0.30 0.13*** 0.09, 0.17 0.07*** 0.03, 0.11 
 (0.02)    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Openness   -0.35*** -0.39, - -0.28*** -0.33, -0.24 -0.27*** -0.31, - -0.20*** -0.24, - -0.15*** -0.19, -
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Conscientiousness   -0.01 -0.04, 0.03 0.13*** 0.09, 0.17 0.09*** 0.05, 0.14 0.11*** 0.07, 0.15 0.09*** 0.05, 0.12 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.117  0.149  0.214  0.233  0.431  0.583  
Notes. OLS regressions. Standardized regression coefficients and 95%CI for the standardized regression coefficients are given. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses are given. DV in models 1-6: Panel A: Models with DV Brexit leave votes. Panel B: Models with DV Trump votes=2016 Republican two-party vote 
share. Panel C: Models with DV Trump gains=Gain in the Republican two-party vote share between 2012 and 2016. The traits neuroticism, openness and 
conscientiousness are weighted by age and gender to match the regional age-gender distribution. The control variables are the same as in Tables 4, 5 and 6 but are 
suppressed due to brevity. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
